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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred When It Granted Fenton’s Suppression Motion Because The
Valid Probation Search Of Fenton’s Vehicle Was Attenuated From His Illegal Detention
Officer Stormes pulled over Fenton on the mistaken belief that Fenton’s vehicle
lacked proper registration, based on a misreading of Fenton’s license plate.
(R., pp.102-03.) During the resulting detention, Fenton volunteered that he was on
probation and Officer Stormes, consistent with standard procedures, contacted Fenton’s
probation officer to explain the situation. (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, L.19 – p.26, L.23.) The
probation officer asked Officer Stormes to detain Fenton until she could arrive and
conduct (based on the terms and conditions of Fenton’s probation) a probation search
of Fenton’s vehicle. (Id., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.25.) Before the search could take place,
however, Fenton fled the scene on foot. (Id., p.28, L.11 – p.29, L.3.) While he was
being apprehended, officers conducted the probation search of Fenton’s car and
discovered methamphetamine. (Id., p.29, Ls.4-20.) The district court suppressed that
evidence, holding, “[i]n this case, but for the officer’s error, the Defendant’s vehicle
would not have been stopped, and the probation officer would not have been
contacted—thus a search would not have occurred.” (R., p.179.) This was error.
As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, while the exclusionary rule
applies to evidence acquired as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation, “exclusion
may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’
cause of obtaining evidence.”

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006).

Evidence is not “fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of police.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487-88 (1963).

Rather, the question is whether police obtained the evidence “by
1

exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.” Id. at 488 (quotation omitted).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized at least three exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, which include the independent source, inevitable discovery, and
attenuated basis doctrines. State v. Stuart, 136 Idaho 490, 496-98, 36 P.3d 1278,
1284-86 (2001). To determine whether unlawful police conduct has been adequately
attenuated, the Court has adopted a three-factor test, reviewing “(1) the elapsed time
between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of
intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004)
(citation omitted); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). As explained
in the state’s opening brief, no one factor is dispositive and not all must be resolved in
favor of the state before the doctrine of attenuation becomes applicable. See State v.
Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000). “The test only
requires a balancing of the relative weights of all the factors, viewed together, in order to
determine if the police exploited an illegality to discover evidence.” Id. (citing United
States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549-550 (4th Cir. 1998)).
The doctrine of attenuation applies to this case because, assuming that Fenton’s
initial detention was unlawful, balancing the relevant factors shows that officers did not
exploit that detention to discover evidence. As set forth in the state’s opening brief, the
temporal proximity in this case, which was more remote than that in either Utah v.
Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016), or Page, supra, should be accorded little (if any) weight
toward suppression. At the time the evidence was discovered, Fenton was no longer
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being detained for the traffic investigation; he was being detained at his probation
officer’s request. Second, the numerous intervening circumstances in this case strongly
favor attenuation. These circumstances include Fenton volunteering that he was on
probation (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.16-25); the probation officer, after learning of the two
officers’ observations of potential drug activity (which occurred prior to any traffic stop),
asking for Fenton to be detained and choosing to search Fenton’s vehicle, consistent
with the terms and conditions of Fenton’s probation (id., p.25, L.12 – p.27, L.25); and
Fenton’s flight as officers began to conduct the probation search of his vehicle (id., p.28,
L.11 – p.29, L.3). Third, Officer Stormes did not flagrantly abuse his authority; he
misread Fenton’s license plate.

The lack of flagrancy in the officer’s conduct also

strongly favors attenuation.
In his respondent’s brief, Fenton argues that, notwithstanding the considerable
time that passed between the completion of the initial detention and the evidence that
was discovered during the subsequent probation search, the temporal proximity in this
case “strongly favors suppression.” (Respondent’s brief, p.12.) It does not. While the
state has never argued that temporal proximity, by itself, favors attenuation in this case,
it must be more favorable to attenuation than the much shorter time-lapse in Streiff.
And in that case the Supreme Court found merely that the temporal proximity “favor[ed]
suppressing the evidence,” and not “strongly.” Streiff, 136 S.Ct. at 2062. Fenton also
argues that Officer Stormes’ miscommunication with dispatch, resulting in the
misidentification of Fenton’s license plate, is the equivalent of flagrant, systemic, or
recurrent police conduct that would favor suppression.
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(Respondent’s brief, p.13.)

Contrary to Fenton’s argument, misreading a license plate does not show a flagrant
abuse of police authority.
Fenton, however, focuses his argument on the intervening circumstances prong.
(Respondent’s brief, pp.6-12.) Fenton asserts that “Officer Stormes’ discovery that [he]
was on probation is not the same as an officer’s discovery that a warrant exists” and
claims that the state is seeking to expand the attenuation doctrine beyond the discovery
of arrest warrants. (Id.) But the discovery of arrest warrants is not the only intervening
circumstance recognized by the Court. On the contrary, Streiff is itself an expansion of
intervening circumstances to the discovery of arrest warrants from the defendant’s
voluntary acts. See Streiff, 136 S.Ct. at 2060-62. As explained by the Supreme Court
in that case, the issue is simply whether “the connection between the unconstitutional
police conduct and the evidence … has been interrupted by some intervening
circumstance,” not whether it was interrupted by the discovery of an arrest warrant. Id.
at 2061 (emphasis added).
In addition to arrest warrants, appellate courts (including the United States
Supreme Court) have found several other circumstances to be “intervening” for
purposes of an attenuation analysis.

Examples of other intervening circumstances

include voluntary confessions following illegal detentions, see Brown, supra, or
voluntary confessions given after Miranda1 warnings where an earlier confession was
obtained before Miranda warnings, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), a
lawful arrest following the flight or resistance of the defendant, see United States v.
Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427,

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4

1431 (8th Cir. 1995), and voluntary acts by third-parties, such as a witness’s decision to
testify, though that witness would have been unknown but for unlawful police conduct,
see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978), a third-party incidentally
identifying the defendant during an illegal detention as a suspect in another crime, see
Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 522-23 (2d Cir. 2006), or the defendant’s
interaction with a third-party agent or agency that had no involvement in the initial
Fourth Amendment violation, see United States v. Yorgensen, 845 F.3d 908, 914-15
(8th Cir. 2017).
Moreover, Fenton acknowledges (albeit in a footnote) that at least one appellate
court has held, in a case where the officer detained the defendant based on a perceived
traffic violation, that the defendant’s probationary status was a sufficient intervening
circumstance to trigger application of the attenuation doctrine. See People v. Durant,
205 Cal. App. 4th 57, 64-66 (2012). And though a separate California appellate court
took a different approach in a case where the officer “purposefully” pulled over a car—
without suspicion of any wrongdoing, merely hoping that the defendant would be in the
car, see People v. Bates, 222 Cal. App. 4th 60, 70-71 (2013), that case is no more
persuasive than Durant. Rather, under the specific facts of this case, including the
officer’s mistaken perception of a traffic violation, the court’s analysis in Durant is far
more relevant.
Finally, Fenton notes that “the probationary search at issue here was conducted
at the discretion of a third person, the probation officer.” (Respondent’s brief, p.6.) This
is correct and, as shown above, it is a factor that significantly favors attenuation. See
Yorgensen, 845 F.3d at 914-15. The probation officer had the discretion to demand
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access to Fenton’s vehicle and to search that vehicle at any time. (R., pp.98-99.) The
probation officer did not have to wait until Fenton was detained or in custody to exercise
that discretion.

That Fenton had been (at least arguably) unlawfully detained was

incidental to the probation officer’s decision to search Fenton’s vehicle. Because the
probation officer—a third-party with no connection to any unlawful police conduct—
chose to search Fenton’s vehicle, and that search was based on Fenton’s consent
under the terms of his probation and not on Officer Stormes’ traffic investigation, there
was no exploitation of the initial detention.
The balance of the relevant factors strongly favors attenuation. Officer Stormes’
mistaken belief that Fenton’s registration was invalid, even if not reasonable, was also
not flagrant. And no evidence was discovered until there had been several intervening
circumstances, including voluntary actions by Fenton in informing the officer of his
probationary status and his later flight, and decisions by the third-party probation officer
who had no involvement in the initial detention. The probation search in this case was
valid because the probation officer did not exploit any primary illegality. That probation
search resulted in the discovery of the evidence Fenton sought to suppress. Because
the evidence was acquired during the valid probation search, the district court erred
when it granted Fenton’s suppression motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s
erroneous order granting Fenton’s suppression motion and that it remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of May, 2017.

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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